Multinational Corporations as Catalyst for Industrial Development: The Case of Poland by Altomonte, Carlo & Resmini, Laura
Multinational Corporations as Catalyst for Industrial
Development: The Case of Poland
By: Carlo Altomonte and Laura Resmini
Working Paper No. 368
February 20012
Multinational Corporations as Catalyst for Industrial Development:The Case of
Poland
by Carlo Altomonte 
a and Laura Resmini 
b (*)
February 2001
Abstract
In a recent model Markusen and Venables (1999) describe the conditions under which foreign
direct investments (FDI) can act as a catalyst for local industrial development. We apply this
framework to the case of Poland, allowing for the entry of multinationals in both
intermediates and consumption goods industry. We check these assumptions against empirical
evidence, exploring agglomeration patterns of multinational and domestic firms at the
regional level, and constructing an econometric model able to measure the interactions
between the two classes of firms. We find evidence going in the direction of both direct spill-
overs and backward and forward linkages between domestic and multinational firms.
JEL classification: F12, F15, F21, P20
Keywords: economic geography, FDI, transition economies
a ISLA-Bocconi University, Milan and LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, KUL, Leuven
b ISLA-Bocconi University, Milan
Contact:
Laura Resmini, Via Gobbi 5, ISLA-Università Luigi Bocconi, 20136 Milano, Italy
Tel: +39.02.5836.5409; Fax: +39.02.5836.5439; email: laura.resmini@uni-bocconi.it
                                                
(*)  The authors wish to thank the participants of the Phare ACE Project on “The impact of EU Foreign Direct
Investment and Trade on Firm Level Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe” (Ref.: P97-8138-R) for
helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.3
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS CATALYST FOR INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT. THE CASE OF POLAND
1. Introduction
One of the main political and economic events in the next years will be the accession of
some of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the European Union (EU).
This process started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and was followed by the
transition of those countries from a socially-planned to a market economy, a phenomenon
receiving widespread attention.
Among economists and political scientists a whole series of theories dedicated at
analysing and predicting the path of such a transition have been developed (Blanchard, 1997;
Repkine and Walsh, 1999); several EU Institutions are devoting significant resources to
finance the set up of market structures in those countries in light of their accession, while
multinational enterprises (MNEs), mainly European, have already acquired significant market
shares in different industrial sectors of the CEECs
1. In light of these processes, it is therefore
interesting to explore the ways in which the industrialisation of the main CEECs has
developed during the transition towards a market economy and the role played by MNEs with
this respect, since in these countries, burdened with the legacy of large and obsolete state
owned enterprises (SOEs) and distorted industrial structures, foreign investments can play an
important role as tools of economic development and industry restructuring.
At the theoretical level, there is a reasonable agreement that MNEs can play a leading
role as an agent of change. The creation of linkages and spillovers with local suppliers,
superior technological content, marketing and management skills, result in higher productivity
and technical efficiency, able to stimulate local rivals to a higher rate of innovation. Current
foreign investments may also have a demonstration effect on other potential investors
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). MNEs, however, can also affect the entire structure of the
industry by changing supply and demand conditions in a number of related industries. They
may modify competitive conditions, damaging domestic industries in one sector but
benefiting firms in other downstream sectors through price reduction and forward linkages to
customer firms, or increasing the demand for local inputs and strengthening domestic supply
industries through backward linkages. These linkages, in turn, may feed other local firms
through spillover effects, hence generating endogenous growth (Markusen and Venables,
1999; Borensztein et al., 1998). Obviously, the magnitude and the sign of these effects may
vary in relation to the characteristics of the countries/regions involved, the strategies followed
                                                
1 Alessandrini (2000) provides a complete survey of this phenomenon.4
by MNEs and the characteristics of the industry in which foreign firms operate, thus resulting
in different net effects (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
In this paper we will therefore try to understand whether and to what extent Western
European firms may act as a catalyst for local industrial development. At this purpose, we
will apply to the case of Poland, the biggest and one of the most advanced accession
countries, a theoretical model developed by Markusen and Venables (1999), discussed in
Section 2 of the paper and modified in order to take into account the transition experience of
Poland. Section 3 shows some static evidence of the phenomenon, presenting patterns of
specialisation of multinational enterprises in Poland relative to domestic firms, with a regional
and industry dimension. Section 4 develops and tests an econometric model able to measure
the interactions between the two classes of firms. Section 5 concludes with some policy
implications.
2. Theoretical background
The increasing evidence of large flows of intra-industry trade, in contrast with the
predictions of the traditional trade theory, and the existence of similar regions with very
different production structures, has brought economists to develop models of trade which
could account for those findings, therefore introducing the hypothesis of increasing returns
and imperfect competition. Within this theoretical framework, it is possible to explicitly
model some of the aggregation forces already listed by Marshall (1890) under three headings:
technological externalities, labour market pooling and intermediate goods supply and demand
(pecuniary externalities).
These models, known under the headline of “New Economic Geography” (NEG), try to
formalise the phenomenon of self-reinforcing cumulative causation that can lead very similar
regions – in terms of their underlying structure – to endogenously differentiate into rich
“core” regions and poor “peripheral” zones
2.
When applying the general results of the NEG literature to the case of  transition
countries, it is however necessary to take into account the causes and patterns of the transition
process and in particular the nature of the evolution of firms’ activities in the area. In fact,
there is nowadays a growing empirical evidence on the fact that the industrialisation process
of the CEECs has been strongly influenced by the presence of Western multinational
enterprises
3. As a result, it seems appropriate to analyse the geography of industrial activities
in the area using a model that not only considers the role of FDI, but goes also beyond simple
country-level dynamics, exploring regional and industry patterns of agglomeration of firms.
                                                
2 See Ottaviano and Puga (1998) for a survey of these models.
3 See Repkine and Walsh (1999), Konings (2000).5
At this purpose, Markusen and Venables (1999) have recently shown the conditions
under which MNEs can act as a catalyst for industrial development, leading to mechanisms of
dynamic cumulative causation in the activities of domestic firms, generating therefore local
agglomeration patterns.
Markusen and Venables start from a world where three kinds of firms are present:
multinational (m), domestic (d) and foreign (f, i.e. exporting to the local markets) firms.
Thanks to a standard Dixit-Stiglitz product differentiation hypothesis, they assume firms to be
symmetrical within types, except for the fact that each produces a slightly different variety of
product, being therefore a monopolist over its own variety
4. There is a single domestic
economy and two monopolistically competitive industries: a downstream industry (c,
consumption) and an upstream industry (i, intermediates). In the Markusen and Venables
framework, consumer goods can be supplied by all three types of firms, while intermediates,
being non-tradable, can be supplied only by domestic firms
5.
However, the hypothesis relative to the intermediate industry is particularly restrictive
when matched with the empirical evidence
6; therefore, we have considered the Markusen and
Venables framework allowing for multinational firms to be present also in the intermediate
sector. As a result, there are five types of firms in the model. We indicate the total number of
each type of firms operating in the host economy as follows:
domestic firms in i-industry: 
d
i n
multinational firms in i-industry: 
m
i n
domestic firms in c-industry:
d
c n
multinational firms in c-industry:
m
c n
foreign exporting firms in c-industry:
f
c n
Our additional assumptions further adds on the analytical complexity of the model,
leading to different patterns of possible agglomeration effects in a given economy. However,
being the paper aimed at exploring the empirical evidence of those effects, any possible
theoretical solution would have implied unrealistic assumptions. As a result, we have decided
to work only on the conclusions of the Markusen and Venables model, adding some
hypotheses on the effects of an entry of multinationals in the i-industry (i.e. an increase in
                                                
4 An implication of this standard framework in NEG models is that it is able to take into account intra-industry
trade.
5 Rodriguez-Clare (1996) in a similar theoretical framework assumes that firms can gain access to intermediate
goods produced outside the home country by becoming multinationals, i.e. by establishing headquarters in the
home country and production plants in the host economy.
6 Markusen and Venables (1997) already developed a model with MNEs operating in both intermediates and
consumption goods industries, although not fully exploring possible catalyst effects arising within this
framework. Alessandrini (2000) provides empirical evidence for the presence of MNEs in both intermediate and
consumption goods industries in the CEECs.6
m
i n ), and leaving to other lines of research the development of a full theoretical model related
to these issues.
2.1 The entry of multinationals in the downstream industry
An exogenous increase in 
m
c n affects the host country’s industrial structure in two ways
(Fig. 1a): first of all, there is a standard product competition effect, according to which the
increased volumes available for consumption depress the price of the c-goods, leading to a
reduction of profits of the domestic firms operating in the c-industry, hence to the exit of part
of them and a reduction in their number, 
d
c n . Secondly, there is a backward linkage effect:
multinationals may raise the total demand for intermediates, increasing therefore the domestic
firms’ profits in the i-industry. This, in turn, can lead to an increase in the number of domestic
firms operating in the i-industry, 
d
i n , as postulated by Markusen and Venables.
The increase of demand faced by i-type domestic firms is such to create a forward
linkage effect: given the assumption of downward sloping average cost curves, the increased
production of the domestic firms in the i-industry will be undertaken at greater levels of
efficiency, thus resulting in increased volumes of the available intermediates at lower prices.
This will have a positive effect on the profitability of domestic firms operating in the c-
industry, and would result at the end in an increase of the number of these firms, 
d
c n .
At this stage, the effect of the entry of c-type MNEs on the total number of domestic
firms operating in the economy, that is, 
d
i n + 
d
c n , leads to an a priori undetermined outcome.
In order to end up with a catalyst effect, it is in fact necessary that either one condition is
matched: i) MNEs use local intermediates more intensively than the domestic firms they
displace in the c-industry; or ii) MNEs displace only foreign firms, with no effects on
domestic firms
7.
If one of these conditions occurs, the overall increased number of c-types domestic firms
will increase the demand for intermediates, which will further contribute to the efficiency of i-
type firms, creating therefore a mechanism of self-reinforcing cumulative causation.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.2. The entry of multinationals in the upstream industry
                                                
7 This would happen if one accepts the controversial hypothesis of FDI and trade as substitute.7
Our additional assumption of the possibility of an entry of MNEs also in the i-industry
generates a more complex set of interlinkages among multinationals and domestic firms.
First of all, we can apply the same logic as before (Fig. 1b). The entry of a  multinational
firm in the i-industry (increase in 
m
i n ), thanks to the higher efficiency reached in the i-
industry characterised by increasing returns to scale, can make more  profitable the production
of  c-goods, thus increasing 
d
c n  through forward linkages; the increased demand of
intermediates so generated creates a backward linkage effect, stimulating production by
domestic firms in the same industry (increase in 
d
i n  not displaced by product competition
effects generated by the entry of  i-type MNEs); the subsequent lower cost of intermediates in
turns has again positive effects on 
d
c n , hence generating a mechanism of cumulative
causation, leading to the agglomeration of economic activities and as a result to a catalyst
effect of FDI over the local economy.
However, the simultaneous presence of multinationals and domestic firms in both
industries, may also reduce, eliminate or even turn negative the catalyst effect. The entry of c-
type MNEs can lead to an increase in the number of multinational firms operating in the
intermediate industry, 
m
i n , rather than an increase in the number of domestic firms in the
same industry, 
d
i n  (Fig. 1c), as well as an increase in 
m
i n  may positively affect
multinationals rather than domestic firms operating in the downstream industry (Fig. 1d).
Taking this logic to the limit, there could be an equilibrium outcome where the self-
reinforcing agglomeration pattern accrues only to multinational firms, thus generating a full
crowding out of domestic production.
In conclusion, the dynamic interaction of domestic and multinational firms may arise
several outcomes, depending on the starting conditions, the extent of displacement of
domestic firms by multinational ones (a function of the degree of use of local intermediates
by multinational firms and of the incumbent market structure), and the shape of the
production function eventually yielding increasing returns to scale. In order to get a clear
understanding of the phenomenon in the case of a transition country, it seems therefore
appropriate to start from the empirical evidence available on those effects, combining it with
the developed theoretical framework in order to derive an econometric model able to pinpoint
the significant interactions arising among firms. The remaining of the paper is devoted to this
exercise.
3. The geography of FDI: a brief description
In this section we examine the spatial and sectoral distribution of multinationals in
Poland during the 1990s in order to investigate whether multinational firms concentrate in8
particular regions (i.e. border regions) and/or sectors, whether these location patterns have
changed over time and whether multinationals follow the same spatial distribution of
domestic ones. These questions draw on the theoretical and empirical findings according to
which the generation of backward and forward linkages is more likely in geographically
concentrated industries (Holmes, 1995; Hansen, 1993).
In order to give a clear answer to our research questions, we have computed synthetic
measures of the spatial distribution of FDI at sector and region levels. We have chosen as
basic unit of analysis the (cumulated) number of firms, indicated by n
h  (with  h = d for
domestic firms; m for multinationals) in a branch j of manufacturing, expressed as a share,
either of the total number of FDI (domestic firms) in region k, or of the entire country, at time
t
8. To explore if multinationals (n
m) and domestic firms (n
d) located in one region concentrate
in few manufacturing branches, we take the absolute values of the difference between these
shares, summed over all manufacturing branches:
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The Krugman specialisation index (Krugman, 1991)
9 so computed takes the value zero if
a region k has a distribution of FDI (domestic firms) among manufacturing branches identical
to the country average, and takes the maximum value of two if the distribution of FDI
(domestic firms) in region k is totally different from the country average. Values of this index
for each region over the period 1990-1997 are shown in table 1. Figures in bold refer to
domestic firms, whose spatial distribution is known only for 1997. The table also reports in
the last two rows the regional average in each year and the corresponding value for the
services sector.
Looking first at average figures, we note in the manufacturing sector a steady fall in the
K-index between 1991 to 1997, indicating that regional specialisation, i.e. FDI’s
concentration in specific sectors within regions, became more homogeneous across the
country over time. The opposite happened in the service sector where the steady increase in
the specialisation index over the period indicates a progressive concentration of FDI in few
regions and branches.
                                                
8 The core data on multinationals used in our analysis are derived from PECODB data base, a unique database on
FDI which provides detailed firm level information at sector and region level on foreign investments undertaken
by  Western European firms in Central and Eastern Europe (Alessandrini, 2000). Domestic firms’ figures,
instead, come from AMADEUS  CD-ROM, a pan European financial database provided by Bureau Van Dijk
Electronic Publishing S.A. Both type of firms have been classified by regional classification according to the
level-3 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). In addition, firms are classified by 3-digits
NACE Rev. 1 code on the basis of their main production.
9 Following the most relevant empirical studies on this topic, “specialisation” refers to the geographical
perspective, while “concentration” to a sectoral one. See among others Hallet (2000), Amiti (1998 and 1999).9
[Table 1 about here]
Turning to individual regions, we observe that at the beginning of the period, only a small
set of regions shows a FDI specialisation completely different from the country’s pattern. It
includes, apart from the capital region, the old industrial poles of Poznan (Wielkopolskie),
Lodz (Lodzkie) and Lubel (Lubelskie). However, while Warsaw seems to have lost its
specialisation immediately
10, the other industrial poles maintain it for all the early 1990s,
becoming more similar to other regions’ specialisation patterns only from 1993 onwards. The
other regions which show a specialisation different from the national average were the
Western border regions, and particularly the south-western region of Zachodnio Pomorskie,
whose K-index was very close to the superior bound in 1991-1993
11. After 1995, the K-index
behaved homogeneously in all regions, indicating that most of changes in the location patterns
of FDI had occurred in 1993-1995, as shown by the absolute changes of the index. In 1997,
only one region, i.e. Podlaskie, differs significantly from the country average in terms of FDI
hosted (K=1.71), although the figure is decreasing progressively. This is probably due to the
delay with which FDI started to be located in such a peripheral region, located in the North-
eastern part of the country, at the Belarus border.
Several interesting conclusions emerge from this static analysis. First of all, FDI in
Poland seem to follow an homogeneous pattern of dispersion over time. MNEs were located
initially in the old industrial poles (Warsaw included), and then spread off all over the
country, following what can be defined an “hub and spoke” pattern (Alessandrini and
Contessi, 1999). This pattern implies that, in terms of geographical concentration, FDI
location choices have likely been driven by market targets or strategic motivations rather than
by the presence of other multinationals. Secondly, proximity to Western Europe does not
seem to have been a driving factor in terms of location of FDI, at least in the early phase of
transition.
Given these dynamics, the static analysis relative to the simple location of foreign
investments supports only in part the idea of agglomeration phenomena among multinationals
operating in Poland. More interesting is the fact that the location patterns of multinationals
show an important similarity with those of domestic firms, since in 1997 the K-indexes are
rather convergent. This result indicates, not surprisingly, that regional specific effects may
have a role in attracting manufacturing plants in specific branches.
                                                
10 Warsaw shows a relative concentration of FDI in services much higher than in manufacturing.
11 In this case, the Krugman specialisation index has to be interpreted with extreme caution, since it accounts for
both positive and negative deviations from the average, i.e. it does not allow to distinguish between
specialisation and de-specialisation dynamics in the location patterns of firms. A more in-depth analysis would
show that border regions display a specialisation patterns of FDI barely different from the national ones
(Altomonte and Resmini, 1999).10
The sectoral perspective of the spatial patterns of multinational and domestic firms in
Poland has been measured by the following coefficient of variation (Hallet, 2000):
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m) and only 1997 for domestic firms (n
d)
h
jt V  is a measure of concentration and captures the spatial dispersion of firms. Table 2
presents the results by branches and over time.
[Table 2 about here]
Two interesting patterns emerge from our findings. First of all, in 1990 multinationals
were spatially concentrated in all sectors but apparels (NACE Code 18). Secondly, the
coefficients of variation follow for most branches a decreasing trend, confirming the
hypothesis that multinationals were more spatially concentrated at the beginning of the
transition. This process of de-concentration has been particularly strong for furniture (36),
metal products (28), electrical machinery and apparatus (31). In 1997, concentration of FDI
was particularly higher in six sectors, i.e. tobacco (16), printing products (22), metals (27),
computers and automatic data processing machines (30), medical and precision instruments
(33) and other transport equipment (35). Finally, at the end of the period, the spatial
distribution of multinationals is consistent with that of domestic firms.
The convergence of the patterns of location of the two groups of firms indicates the
existence of a relationship between them; the statistical analysis shows the existence of a
significant positive correlation between the presence of multinational firms in a given
sector/region and their domestic counterparts (Table 3). The theoretical model previously
                                                
12 The interpretation of h
jkt S  index is straightforward: When  h
jkt S = 1 sector j share of multinationals (domestic
firms) in region k matches that of the average of all the regions in Poland. Instead, if  h
jkt S  > 1 ( h
jkt S  < 1) sector
j share of multinationals (domestic firms) in region k is greater (less) than the average of all the regions in the
country; therefore, multinationals (domestic firms) in region k is more (less) concentrated in sector j than the
average of all the regions. For a more in depth-discussion of the properties of this index, see Altomonte and11
sketched explains such agglomeration patterns through the creation of backward and forward
linkages generated by the entry of multinationals, which significantly affects the performance
of domestic firms, leading eventually to an increase in their number (catalyst effect). It is
therefore worth using econometric techniques to check whether the forces responsible for
such agglomeration patterns are actually those identified by the economic theory.
[Table 3 about here]
4. The econometric model
In principle, many different factors can be responsible for the generation of
agglomeration effects, deriving from both NEG theories and the traditional location
determinants identified by neo-classic theories. In particular, in order to disentangle “pure”
NEG effects, we have to control for region-specific endowments and industry-specific
dynamics (Brülhart, 1998, p. 796). Failing to do so would lead us to a critical identification
problem: if multinationals gravitate towards more productive industries or regions, then the
possible correlation between the presence of multinationals and the performance of
domestically-owned firms will not necessarily be dependent on the positive impact of foreign
investments (Aitken and Harrison, 1999, p. 606). The theoretical approach previously
described rests however on an intra-industry mechanism of backward and forward linkages
that explicitly models these firm interactions through industry specific effects (consumption
versus intermediate goods); such a structure should allow us to overcome, at least in principle,
the identification problem. Thus, the model to estimate has to be based on the following
general structure:
where the superscripts indicate the type of firm (domestic d vs. multinational m) and industry
(intermediate i vs. consumption, where no indication appears), while the subscripts indicate
the j
th sector of the k region in year t. In order to measure backward and forward linkages,
each sector j is considered in its two components of consumption and intermediate goods
production (see Annex 2), allowing us to identify backward and forward linkages accruing on
the upstream (equation A) vs. downstream (equation B) domestic firms.
The dependent variable is the performance ( jkt Π ) of upstream (downstream) domestic
firms, which is, according to the theory, affected by multinationals through three channels:
                                                                                                                                            
Resmini (1999).
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i)  a direct product competition effect generated by the presence of multinationals (measured
by n) operating in the same upstream (downstream) industry of domestic firms;
ii)  a backward (forward) linkage effect created by the presence of multinationals operating
in the downstream (upstream) industry;
iii)  the combination of a backward and forward linkage effect obtained via the interaction of
multinationals in the upstream (downstream) industry and domestic firms in the
downstream (upstream) industry.
On the right hand side of the equations, therefore, the first variable indicates product
competition effects. The second variable measures backward (forward) linkages, relating
multinationals and domestic firms operating in the two different industries: since this effect is
a function of the degree with which multinationals use local intermediates, we have to control
for that in the regression through the term 
i
jt I . Finally, the third variable of the model
captures the effect of the interaction between multinationals and domestic firms in the
relevant industries.
Apart from the “catalyst” outcome, our theoretical hypotheses suggest also that, once
allowing for the entry of multinationals also in the upstream industry, backward and forward
linkages between multinationals and domestic firms may be weakened by the presence of
self-agglomeration effects among multinationals (see fig. 1c and 1d). In order to estimate the
importance of these effects, we have thus to consider also the following model:
where symbols have the usual meaning.
According to these equations the presence of upstream (downstream) multinationals in
sector j, region k at time t, may be affected by:
i)  a self-agglomeration process among multinationals, picked by the first variable on the
right hand side of the equations (Wheeler and Mody, 1992);
ii)  a product competition effect generated by the presence of domestic firms operating at the
same stage of production, measured by the second explanatory variable of both equations;
iii)  a backward (forward) linkage created by the presence of domestic firms operating in the
downstream (upstream) industry, which is in turn a function of the degree of intensity in
the use of intermediates (last two variables of the equations).
We recall that, in order to end up with a catalyst effect, self agglomeration processes
among multinationals should not fully offset backward and forward linkages.
Integrating both specifications with a model design which appropriately controls for
region specific endowments, as well as industry specific characteristics, as previously
mentioned, should then lead to a correct identification of “pure” NEG effects operating within
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the samples of firms (domestic vs foreign firms) in each type of industry (consumption goods
vs intermediates in each sector j). For this reason, we control in both models for a full set of k
region-specific dummy variables ( k φ ) and of j sector specific dummy variables, j ϑ .
Moreover, in order to capture possible common aggregate shocks over the period considered,
or some other unobserved time varying factors, we also include fixed time effects,  t τ . This
implies that the error term of the model,  jkt ε , can be written as follows:
jkt t j k jkt η + τ + ϑ + φ = ε     (E)
where  jkt η  is the standard i.i.d. residual.
4.1 Definition of variables and econometric issues
The combination of the regional and sector dimension yields a panel data specification of
sectors j and regions k over time t (1995-1998). We have aggregated firm-level observations
for both European multinationals and domestic firms over the defined 16 NUTS-III Polish
regions (see Annex 1) for ten different manufacturing sectors: Food, Textiles, Chemicals,
Metal Products, Motor vehicles, Domestic Appliances, Leather, Wood and Furniture, Paper
and printing products. The distinction between intermediates and consumption goods industry
is undertaken, in the absence of input-output tables for Poland, through the assignment of
each firm (domestic or multinational) to the i- or c-industry according to the classification
reported in Annex 2
13.
The dependent variables proxying domestic firms’ performance in the upstream and
downstream industries (equations A and B) are the aggregated (over firm data) level of sales
of domestic firms in each industry in sector j and region k in year t. We use as a dependent
variable aggregated, and not per capita, sale figures since we are interested in exploring the
impact of the presence of multinationals on the overall performance of the local industry, in
terms of its possible expansion (and hence the birth of catalyst effects)
14.
In order to avoid problems of simultaneity between the presence of multinationals and the
performance of domestic firms, we have lagged one period all the observations related to
                                                
13 The classification is derived from the NACE-CLIO classification and coding of branches and products of the
European Union, at the basis of the construction of input-output tables.
14 An entry of a multinational firm inducing, via forward linkages, an entry of a certain number of domestic
firms, can be such to generate a decrease (and not an increase) of per capita domestic firms’ sales. On the
contrary, the relationship between aggregated domestic firms’ sales and the number of multinationals operating
in the industry can go only in an univocal direction according to the kind of effect generated.14
MNEs, measuring their presence through the concentration of multinationals, calculated for
the i- and c-type industries, operating in sector j in region k over time
15.
The interaction term of domestic and multinational firms is calculated as the product of
the share of upstream (downstream) multinationals in a given sector/region, lagged one
period, times the number of downstream (upstream) domestic firms operating in the same
sector/region, when modelling i- and c-type domestic firms, respectively. The intensity in the
use of locally produced intermediates has been proxied by the international trade orientation
of each sector, measured as the share of imports (exports) of the i-industry over the total
import and export flows of the sector
16. As a result, taking the natural logarithm of the total
sales level of domestic firms, the baseline model to be estimated takes the following form:
(1A)
(1B)
Concerning equations C and D, we estimate possible self agglomeration effects
considering the (cumulated) number of multinationals and domestic firms in region k, sector j
and year t, operating in upstream (C) and downstream (D) industry. As before, explanatory
variables referring to multinationals have been lagged one period to avoid simultaneity
problems. Therefore, the equations to be estimated are specified as follows:
We use the cumulated number of multinationals rather than shares since in this model
specification we are interested in capturing “pure” location patterns of the same
multinationals, regardless of their concentration dynamics in each sector/region. Given the
specification of Models 1A to 1D, standard fixed-effects panel estimation techniques have
been employed for all models.
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4.2 Estimation Results
The first two columns of Table 4 show the results of the econometric estimation for
equations 1A and 1B.
The combined analysis of the two equations reveals that multinationals can act as a catalyst
for industrial development. An increase in the concentration of multinationals in the
consumption goods industry has significant positive effects (backward linkage) on the level of
sales of domestic firms in the upstream industry (column 1A). The reverse (evidence of a
forward linkage) is true for the performance of domestic firms in the downstream industry
(column 1B). The quantitative effect of these linkages appears to be strong in both
industries
17. The concentration of multinationals operating at the same stage of the production
process of domestic firms seems not to affect significantly the performance of domestic firms,
indicating that potential product competition effects do not weaken eventual backward and
forward linkages. Concerning the interactions between domestic firms and multinationals, a
positive relationship is recorded in both industries, although statistically significant only in
the c-type industry. Finally, the fact that the coefficients of the export and import orientation
of the intermediate sector are not statistically significant suggests that backward and forward
linkages are not affected by the availability of locally produced intermediates. However, trade
orientation is only an indirect measure of the underlying production structure; consequently,
this last result has to be interpreted with extreme caution.
Interpreting the econometric outcome in light of the theoretical model behind this
econometric exercise, we find therefore general support for the idea that the entry of
multinationals can act, via backward and forward linkages, as an incubator of industrial
development. In particular, we have shown that downstream domestic firms benefit from
forward linkages of upstream multinationals and from forward linkages deriving from
upstream domestic firms, which in turn take advantage of the backward linkages accruing
from the presence of multinationals in the downstream industry. However, since we do not
find a significant evidence of backward linkages from downstream to upstream domestic
firms, we can not support the idea of an agglomeration pattern ignited by multinationals and
then self-sustaining only among domestic firms, at least within this model design. In other
words, according to our theoretical framework, the continuous entry of multinationals over
time is a necessary condition for this economy to generate positive growth levels
18.
                                                
17 These coefficients are relative growth rates, since domestic firm sales are in the log form.
18 Theoretically, this can be explained by the fact that, since in our framework downstream domestic firms are
not forced to buy intermediates from upstream domestic firms (while Markusen and Venables (1999) model the
intermediate sector as non-tradable), the possibility of exploiting upstream multinationals or importing the
intermediate goods loosen their links with upstream domestic firms.16
Finally, we find no evidence for time effects, while region and sector heterogeneity affect
domestic firms’ performance, as expected.
[Table 4 about here]
Following our theoretical framework, in order to evaluate the magnitude of the
relationships previously discussed, we also need to consider the presence of potential self-
agglomeration effects among multinationals. In this case, we are interested in understanding
whether multinationals’ location processes are driven by the presence of other, already
established, foreign firms, rather than by domestic firms
19. In fact, if self-agglomeration
phenomena accrue on multinationals and depend negatively from the presence of domestic
firms, a further entry of multinationals can offset the results previously discussed, eventually
leading to the creation of “enclave” economies within the host country (Rodriguez-Clare,
1996; Hardy, 1998).
Table 5 provides the estimation results for equations 1C and 1D in its first two columns.
Multinationals evaluate significantly and positively self-agglomeration benefits, but these
accrue not only within multinationals, but also between multinationals and domestic firms, in
line with the empirical evidence shown in section three. Again, sector and region
heterogeneity exert a significant effect on the location decision processes of multinationals.
[Table 5 about here]
4.3 Robustness issues and sensitivity analysis
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we have tested alternative specifications
of our general equations. We introduce two types of differences: first of all, we adopt different
proxies for our explanatory variables; secondly, we impose some restrictions on the sample.
Concerning the first model, we consider a different measure of the presence of
multinationals at sector and region level. In particular, we re-estimate equations A and B
substituting the share of multinationals in each industry, sector and regions with the sectoral
specification of the previously defined Krugman index, lagged one period. We therefore use a
measure of relative and not absolute concentration. The results are shown in columns 2A and
2B of table 4. Coefficient magnitudes and patterns of significance are in line with those in the
corresponding first two columns of table 4. In addition, the results clearly indicate the
presence of a significant direct product competition effect in the c-industry, of a “pure”
spillover effect in the i-industry, and a positive backward linkage effect accruing to upstream
                                                
19 Evidence for self-agglomeration effects among multinationals is provided by Wheeler and Mody (1992).17
domestic firms from the interaction of upstream multinationals and downstream domestic
firms and vice-versa. Although these results are perfectly consistent with our theoretical
hypotheses, even strengthening the significance of our findings (we have here evidence of a
catalyst outcome), it should be mentioned that the previously discussed ambiguity that
characterises the interpretation of the Krugman index is not overcome by the econometric
analysis. However, the fact that absolute and relative concentration measures exert the same
impact on the performance of domestic firms reassuringly indicates that we might be
considering specialisation and not de-specialisation patterns in both cases.
As far as the second model is concerned, we consider as a robustness test the explicit
inclusion of regional characteristics. According to the literature on FDI determinants,
multinationals consider in their decision processes the following location variables
20:
-  the gross domestic product of each region k over time, denoted as gdpkt and derived by
Eurostat, as a proxy for the absolute size of the local market
21 (Wheeler and Mody,
1992);
-  the distance of the quickest road link between the capital city of each region and Warsaw
(distWAk) and a specific dummy for Western regions (border), in order to test whether it
exists a positive relationship between agglomeration effects and the proximity to the
region with which the area is establishing an integration process (Hanson, 1998).
Columns 2C and 2D of table 5 show the results of this further estimation. Again, the
results are very similar to the corresponding columns 1C and 1D. Regional characteristic
variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant in the consumption good sub-
sample, while multinationals operating in the intermediate industry positively react to an
increase in the GDP level, indicating that they might prefer locations with better
infrastructures. The lack of significance of the distance variable in this case might suggest that
upstream multinationals serve prevalently local customers (both foreign and domestic).
In terms of sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate equations 1A and 1B imposing two
restrictions on the sample. So far, we have in fact assumed that backward and forward
linkages among multinationals and domestic firms accrue equally in all sectors and regions.
This approach is somewhat restrictive. Some sectors produce goods that are intensive in some
immobile inputs, while some regions, may have a concentration of firms, in absolute terms,
structurally higher than other locations, increasing for that reason the probability to generate
backward and forward linkages. In order to control for potential sample biases that could
generate spurious results, we alternatively drop from the sample the Paper and printing sector,
                                                
20We recall however that the focus of this paper is not an analysis of FDI determinants. Rather, we are interested
in discovering whether multinationals, given their location, generate backward and forward linkages with
domestic firms.
21 At the beginning, we included also two different measures of the level of infrastructures. We dropped both of
them since they show a very strong correlation with the level of GDP.18
which is relatively intensive in immobile resources (Hanson, 1998), and the observations
relative to the capital region
22.
Table 6 shows the results for equations 1A and 1B. Again the results are quite similar to
those in the corresponding columns of table 4.
[Table 6 about here]
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper studies the impact of multinationals on the industrial structure of the host
country. We focus on the generation of backward and forward linkages distinguishing effects
accruing between multinationals and domestic firms from those involving only foreign-owned
enterprises. The particular case we consider is Poland, one of the most advanced accession
country, with a conspicuous inflow of FDI, coming mainly from Western Europe.
The results obtained seem consistent with the peculiar experience of this country. It has
been already stated by the theory (Blanchard, 1997) and also by the empirical evidence
(Alessandrini, 2000), that the early entry of multinationals in both stages of the production
processes is likely to have disrupted historic ties between domestic firms operating along the
value-added chain (the so-called “creative disruption”), forcing the same firms to go through
costly restructuring, and only later stimulating economic growth, as witnessed by the u-
shaped pattern of industrial output in transition countries over time. Our results fit nicely
within this framework, since we find positive backward and forward linkages accruing from
multinationals to domestic firms, and hence stimulating growth once multinationals are
established, but not a significant interaction between upstream and downstream domestic
firm, a signal that historic ties have been disrupted and (eventually) still need to be
reconstructed. Another interesting fact emerging from our analysis is that multinationals seem
to condition their location also on the presence of domestic firms.
These findings have some clear policy implications: the presence of FDI maximises its
positive effects for the host country when multinationals can capitalise on a pre-existing
structure of domestic firms, of which they enhance the performance and hence contribute, as
“incubators”, to the creation of a sound local industrial structure. Once the presence of
multinational firms is established, this becomes however a necessary condition for industrial
development, since such a presence is not sufficient to generate a self-sustaining pattern of
growth within domestic firms, given the fact that these firms do not seem to significantly
interact among themselves. Hence, the need of policies aimed at either sustaining the entry of
                                                
22 We have not enough degrees of freedom to either consider simultaneously these restrictions or the possibility
to drop other regions or sector from the sample.19
multinationals over time or at (re)building stronger industrial ties among domestic firms,
which in turn might stimulate the location of multinationals and generate the catalyst effects
postulated by the theory.20
Fig. 1. Entry of multinationals and catalyst effect on domestic firms
Figure 1a (Markusen and Venables, 1999):
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Table 1. Krugman specialisation index ( h
kt K ) by region and year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 D 1992/1990 1995/1993 1996/1997
Dolnoslaskie* n.a. 1.57 1.27 0.97 0.82 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.35 n.a. -0.38 0.00
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.92 1.06 0.86 0.87 0.77 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.56 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02
Lubelskie** 1.69 1.69 1.78 1.17 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.08 -0.20 -0.01
Lubuskie* n.a. 1.73 1.55 1.34 1.11 1.15 1.00 1.06 1.01 n.a. -0.19 0.07
Lodzskie** 1.69 1.25 1.03 0.84 0.79 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.58 -0.66 -0.14 -0.01
Malopolskie n.a. 1.76 1.35 1.39 1.08 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.57 n.a. -0.59 0.01
Mazowieckie*** 1.69 0.64 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.44 -1.15 -0.12 0.00
Opolskie n.a. n.a. 1.48 1.27 1.22 1.18 1.19 1.18 0.99 n.a. -0.10 -0.01
Podkarpackie n.a. n.a. 1.38 1.30 1.10 1.06 0.90 0.90 0.59 n.a. -0.24 0.00
Podlaskie n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.88 1.78 1.72 1.71 0.87 n.a. n.a. -0.01
P o m o r s k i e * * 1 . 2 31 . 6 11 . 0 40 . 7 10 . 6 50 . 6 60 . 6 80 . 6 9 0.98 -0.19 -0.05 0.01
Slaskie** n.a. 1.76 1.36 0.91 0.87 0.80 0.63 0.65 0.72 n.a. -0.10 0.02
Swietokrzyskie n.a. n.a. 1.48 1.53 1.50 1.21 1.10 1.11 1.19 n.a. -0.32 0.00
Warminsko-Mazurskie n.a. 1.76 1.25 1.21 1.05 1.02 1.06 1.05 0.92 n.a. -0.19 -0.01
Wielkopolskie** 1.69 1.25 1.05 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.56 -0.64 -0.12 -0.01
Zachodnio-Pomorskie* 1.54 1.80 1.85 1.75 1.53 0.87 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.31 -0.88 0.01
Average 1.49 1.49 1.28 1.09 1.02 0.89 0.84 0.85 0.75 -0.21 -0.19 0.00
Service sector 1.06 1.13 1.15 1.42 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.44 0.88
*Regions bordering with Western Europe. **Industrial poles. ***Capital Region.
Figures in bold refer to domestic firms in 1997.
Table 2. Coefficients of variation ( h
jt V ) by sector and year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 D
15 1.43 1.42 0.95 0.84 0.80 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.49
16 2.92 3.63 2.79 3.13 2.52 1.99 2.00 3.87
17 2.92 2.48 2.57 2.20 2.12 1.90 1.88 1.14
18 0.92 1.90 2.18 1.16 1.05 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.73
19 1.79 2.92 3.63 2.53 2.81 2.35 1.79 1.80 1.46
20 1.79 1.70 1.96 1.98 2.14 1.89 1.62 1.63 1.12
21 1.71 1.92 1.74 1.61 1.42 1.43 1.30
22 2.92 3.63 2.52 2.18 2.30 2.12 2.12 2.22
24 1.79 2.18 1.77 1.30 1.40 1.23 0.93 0.95 0.72
25 1.31 1.70 1.84 1.27 1.24 1.32 0.99 0.97 0.97
26 2.02 1.92 1.65 1.14 1.14 0.89 0.90 0.92
27 2.93 2.23 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 1.40
28 2.92 2.33 1.55 1.69 1.43 1.25 1.25 0.63
29 1.79 1.34 1.47 1.39 2.10 1.69 1.35 1.30 0.69
30 na na 3.87 3.87 2.99 2.99 2.65
31 2.43 1.98 1.46 1.25 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.05
32 2.53 2.01 1.75 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.74 1.93
33 2.35 2.74 2.63 2.80 2.78 2.22 2.23 2.72
34 1.79 2.64 2.66 1.77 1.62 1.48 1.49 1.50 1.64
35 1.79 2.92 3.63 3.63 2.71 2.73 2.16 2.16 1.11
36 2.92 2.25 1.81 1.56 1.46 1.13 1.10 1.18
Figures in bold refer to domestic firms in 1997. Nace Rev. 1 codes in the left hand column are explained in the
Annex.22
Tab. 3 – multinationals vs domestic firms’ patterns of location (t=1997)
d
kt K d
jt V
m
kt K
0.798*
(N=16)
m
jt V
0.690*
(N=21)
Spearman’s rho coefficient of correlation;
*correlation is significant at  0.01 level.
Table 4: Testing for catalyst effects among multinational and domestic firms
Variables 
a MODEL 1A MODEL 1B MODEL 2A MODEL 2B
s
id DepVar DepVar
s
d DepVar DepVar
q
m 4.24***
(1.18)
-.450
(.895)
q
im 1.04
(1.25)
2.49***
(.713)
K
m 3.53**
(1.50)
-2.45**
(1.21)
K
im 4.52***
(1.44)
3.86***
(.864)
n
id * q
m .014**
(.006)
.010*
(.006)
n
d * q
im .010
(.005)
.011**
(.005)
EXP
i -.129
(3.18)
.302
(3.12)
IMP
i 4.08
(3.80)
5.18
(3.85)
Regional dummies 
b 5.05*** 3.76*** 5.54*** 3.89***
Sector dummies
 b 21.05*** 7.01*** 18.28*** 11.64***
Time dummies
 b .22 .03 .27 .01
Const 5.52***
(1.85)
12.02***
(.687)
5.75***
(1.88)
12.05***
(.649)
n. obs. 291 303 291 303
R. sq. (adj.) .45 .39 .44 .41
F test 8.78*** 7.41*** 8.64*** 8.01***
Standard errors in parenthesis.
a  All variables related to multinationals (m) are lagged one period.
b The Table reports the Wald test of joint significance of coefficients23
Table 5: Testing for self-agglomeration effects among multinationals
Variables 
a MODEL 1C MODEL 1D MODEL 2C MODEL 2D
n
im Dep. Var .254***
(.058)
Dep. Var .301***
(.061)
n
m .068***
(.024)
Dep. Var .063***
(.024)
Dep.Var
n
d -.081
(.041)
.676***
(.065)
-.034
(.039)
.602***
(.066)
n
id .147***
(.034)
-.054
(.058)
.148***
(.034)
-.123**
(.061)
EXP
i 1.58
(3.73)
1.66
(4.03)
IMP
i -4.32
(2.53)
-4.25
(2.62)
ln (gdp) .679***
(.089)
.883***
(.156)
DistWA -.001
(.001)
-.004***
(.001)
Border .115
(.162)
.803***
(.282)
Regional dummies 
b 8.19*** 12.38***
Sector dummies
 b 13.20*** 5.85*** 12.88*** 6.32***
Time dummies
 b 2.74** 1.76 .40 .47
Const 2.89**
(1.23)
1.57
(.867)
-3.18**
(1.46)
-4.00***
(1.52)
n. obs. 576 576 576 576
R. sq. (overall) .37 .66 .33 .60
F test 12.45*** 38.52*** 16.57*** 49.79***
Standard errors in parenthesis.
a When entering in the estimations as independent variables, the cumulated number of MNEs in the upstream
(downstream) industry has been lagged one period in order to avoid potential problems of simultaneity.
b The Table reports the Wald test of joint significance of coefficients24
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis
Variables 
a Model 3A
(Paper Sector)
Model 3B
(Paper Sector)
Model 4A
(Capital Region)
Model 4B
(Capital Region)
s
id DepVar DepVar
s
d DepVar DepVar
q
m 4.08***
(1.18)
-.534
(.894)
3.51***
(1.1)
-.807
(.890)
q
im 1.10
(1.26)
2.53***
(.705)
.680
(1.18)
2.41***
(.695)
n
id * q
m .013**
(.006)
.014**
(.006)
n
d * q
im .010*
(.005)
.020**
(.008)
EXP
i -.761
(3.24)
-.173
(3.21)
IMP
i 4.32
(3.87)
4.05
(3.58)
Regional dummies 
b 4.94*** 4.78*** 6.76*** 4.19***
Sector dummies
 b 23.11*** 7.58*** 20.14*** 8.13***
Time dummies
 b .28 .11 .20 .02
Const 5.39***
(1.88)
12.26***
(.713)
5.59***
(1.73)
12.05***
(.691)
n. obs. 282 270 267 279
R. sq. (adj.) .44 .42 .48 .41
F test 8.61*** 7.83*** 9.61*** 7.65***
Standard errors in parenthesis.
a  All variables related to multinationals (m) are lagged one period.
b The Table reports the Wald test of joint significance of coefficients
Models 3A and 3B exclude Paper and printing product sector; models 4A and 4B do not consider Warsaw
region.25
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Annex 1. The regional classification of Polish regions
Poland has revised its regional classification system since January 1999, passing from 49 non-
homogeneous  voivodships to 16 new regions, in line with the NUTS-III equivalent
classification system (this implied a change of some of the internal borders). The following
list classifies the new regions with their administrative capital city and their peculiar location.
Region Capital city location
1. Dolnoslaskie  Wroclaw West border
2. Kujawsko Bydgoscz
3. Lubelskie Lublin Industrial pole
4. Lubuskie  Gorzow West border
5. Lodzkie Lodz Industrial pole
6. Malopolskie Krakow
7. Mazowieckie Warszawa Capital region
8. Opolskie Opole
9. Podkaparckie  Rzeszow
10. Podlaskie Bialystock
11. Pomorskie  Gdansk Industrial pole
12. Slaskie Katowice Industrial pole
13. Swietokrzyskie  Kielce
14. Warminsko  Olsztyn
15. Wielkopolskie Poznan Industrial pole
16. Zachodnio Pomorskie  Szczecin West border
Annex 2 – The classification of industries
Industry Consumption (Nace Rev. 1) Intermediates (Nace Rev. 1)
Food and beverages 15 01, 02, 05; 2923, 2953, 2522
Textiles and Clothing 174, 175, 177, 18 171, 172, 173, 176, 2954, 247
Chemicals 243, 244, 245, 246 23, 241, 242
Constructions 45 263-268, 2922, 2523, 2812, 2863, 315
Metal products 282 27
Motor vehicles 341, 342 343, 2914, 251, 314, 3161
Domestic appliances 297 311, 312, 313, 3162
Leather and leather products 193 191, 192
Wood and Furniture 36 20
Paper and paper product 212, 221, 222 211
Industry codes are drawn from the NACE Rev. 1 (2-, 3- and 4-digits) classification of industrial activities of the
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